On May 23, 1957, police officers in Cleveland, Ohio, received information that Cleveland native Dollree Mapp was harboring a bombing suspect in her home. There was also a reason to believe that the house had illegal gambling equipment. When the police arrived at Mapp's house to search it, Mapp called her attorney and refused to let the police in without a search warrant.
The police stationed themselves outside Mapp's home to keep vigilant. Three hours later, they sought entrance again. When Mapp did not come to the door immediately, the police forced it open and entered the house. Mapp demanded to see a search warrant and grabbed a piece of paper the police waved at her. The police struggled with Mapp to get the paper back, hurt her in the process, and arrested her. The paper that caused the violent arrest of Mapp was proven not to be a search warrant.
Once Mapp was arrested and displaced, the police searched her entire house from wall to wall, destroying many valuable possessions of Mapp’s in the process. The police found no evidence of the bombing suspect or any gambling equipment. They did, however, find “obscene materials” that were in violation of Ohio's obscenity law. Mapp was charged with violating said obscenity law. She was convicted and was given a hefty prison sentence.
THE PATH TO THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUESTION
Mapp began a long of difficult road to appeals. Her main argument to overturn the conviction was that Ohio's obscenity law violated her right to freedom of thought under the First Amendment. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument. Mapp’s most powerful arugement was that Ohio should not be allowed to convict her using evidence found during an illegal search without a warrant. The Ohio Supreme Court also surprisingly rejected this argument and affirmed Mapp's conviction.
Mapp then appealed her case to the Supreme Court. The case came down to this fundamental question: is evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth Amendment admissible in state courts? The Fourth Amendment states "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment, however, does not define when a search or seizure becomes "unreasonable". It also does not explain how evidence obtained from an "unreasonable" search should be treated.
Mapp's case was not the first case to ask this kind of question. In several rulings leading up to Mapp, the Supreme Court had tried to answer questions about what exactly the Fourth Amendment means. They had agreed that neither federal nor state officials could conduct unreasonable searches. Furthermore, in Weeks v. United States, they had determined that federal officials could not use evidence obtained in said unreasonable searches at trial. However, they had not ruled on whether states could use illegally seized evidence to convict a criminal. Some states, including Ohio, felt that they should be able to make their own determination regarding this issue. Doing so would be consistent with historical tradition—states had always supervised the operation of their criminal justice systems.
In 1960, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Mapp's case and determine whether the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, which said the Fourth Amendment applies to the states, prohibited state officials from using evidence obtained in an unreasonable search.
THE COURT
Chief Justice Earl Warren, along with Associate Justices Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John M. Harlan II , William J. Brennan, Jr., Charles E. Whittaker, and Potter Stewart, oversaw the Mapp case. Warren led a liberal majority that used judicial power that expanded civil rights and liberties, judicial power and and federal power. The court was both applauded and criticized for bringing an end to racial segregation and ending officially sanctioned voluntary prayer in schools. The period is recognized as a high point in judicial power, and the liberal and dramatically good nature of the Warren courts proved true in the Mapp ruling.
THE OUTCOME
The case was ruled in Mapp's favor by a vote of 6–3. The court explicitly stated that the exclusionary rule applies to states, arguing that the state cannot use evidence gained by illegal means to convict. This overturned the Wolf ruling. Justice Clarke, writing the majority opinion, explained that the court’s decision is based on the connection between the Fourth and the Fifth Amendment. "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government." The court reasoned that, if the right of privacy as indicated in the Fourth Amendment controls state actions, so too should the Fourth's exclusionary rule. Justice Clark also invoked common sense, stating that the exclusionary rule was implied to both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Justice Clark dismissed the argument that this rule allows criminals to go free as a result of honest police mistake, writing that "it is the law that sets him [the criminal] free" and that "nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws."
In the concurring opinion, Justice Black expressed doubt that the Fourth Amendment alone could be used to prohibit illegally obtained evidence's use in state courts to convict, primarily because such an exclusion is not explicitly stated. He believed the language restricting unreasonable searches and seizures is framed too modestly to allow an interpretation so vast as exclusionary. These differences aside, he claims when the "Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies, but actually requires the exclusionary rule."Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion argued that, the majority had wrongly "reached out" to overrule Wolf, saying "... I can perceive no justification for regarding this case as an appropriate occasion for re-examining Wolf" and complaining that the issue had not been properly briefed. He also felt that the wrong question was brought up.
EVALUATIONThe ruling in the Mapp case has set a precedent in protecting American citizens and ensuring a just and functioning federal government. As Clarke stated during the Mapp ruling, "Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt [disrespect] for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." The Mapp decision has help to preserve and ensure that the government does not become this.
SOURCES
Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953-1969, 2005.
Wetterer, Charles M. The Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure. Enslow Publishers, Inc., 1998.
www.streetlaw.org/en/Page/358/How_the_Case_Moved_through_the_Court_System
Stewart, Potter, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 1993.
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